

SUICIDE TERROR



WILEY

PREFACE

Sunday is the first day of the week in Israel. It has that “Monday morning” feeling, when everyone heads back to their routines. Both men and women serve in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), two years for women and three for men from the age of 18.

These young men and women were making their way, sleepily, from the welcome relief of home and home comforts, back to their bases for another hectic week of service on the cool morning of Sunday, January 22, 1995. Many of them converged on a junction to the north of Tel Aviv and near the coastal city of Netanya, where buses would ferry them all over the country. The junction served as a meeting point for paratroop units that were reporting back to duty at 9 A.M. sharp. They frequently set their watches by the beeps of the 9 A.M. news; a news bulletin few Israelis miss. That morning the junction would have been swamped with men and women in uniform rushing to get back to their bases on time.

HaSharon Junction, commonly known as Beit Lid Junction, is not a scenic crossroads. It intersects Highway 4, which goes north and south, and Highway 57, which goes east and west. It was in that time really a large bus stop with several covered and uncovered stops for dozens of different bus lines that came in and out to pick up anyone there. On the southwest corner of the junction is the Ashmoret Prison—a civilian jail.

For weeks, a group of young Palestinian men allowed into Israel to work and earn money for their families had been doing reconnaissance on the junction, and it had nothing to do with which bus they should take.

Notwithstanding the effort that had been made to establish the Palestinian Authority as a result of Oslo agreements, along with the efforts of the Rabin Government to placate the demands of the then-head of the Palestinian Authority, Yassir Arafat, other factions within the Authority were more than ready to play the bad guys while Arafat feigned conciliation. The Palestine Islamic Jihad funded by people—such as Professor Sami al-Arian at the South Florida University in Tampa—and a network that spread across the United States—had other plans.

At 9:30 A.M., on that fateful morning a Palestinian named Anwar Soukar feigned intense stomach pains and dropped to his knees. As soldiers gathered around him to help, Soukar reached into his bag and detonated the first bomb.

Bodies were instantly transformed into bleeding projectiles of disconnected appendages as a result of the blast wave—many to be found as shreds embedded

in the surrounding trees, on fences, and under bus benches. The packed scene of devastation was now the scene of hundreds running toward the blast to rescue whomever they could. As first responders began descending on the scene in great numbers to tend to those wounded with a chance of survival, another member of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Salaah Shaaker, detonated a bomb that he wore on his chest so that the blast would go out and kill and maim as many first responders as possible.

The massacre caused the deaths of 21, and more than 69 were injured. It was not Israel's first suicide bombing; there had already been others, but it was the first double bombing; a suicide terror mission designed to instill fear and hopelessness in the population. Almost all the victims were paratroopers from the same brave units that had once freed Jerusalem—now helplessly slaughtered—and it underlined the vulnerability of first responders to this type of attack.

At nearby Ashmoret Prison, which held the founder of another bloody terrorist group known as Hamas, Sheik Ahmed Yassin was whisked away; the prison officials believed that this might be the first volley in an attempt to free him. In the Palestinian Authority, the engineer or master bomb maker Ihyah Ayyash, would have been celebrating his handy work.

For the Israeli Government's Prime Minister, Yitzhak, who told his cabinet a few days later that suicide terror was a strategic threat to the existence of the State of Israel, this was an attack that marked a turning point. Benjamin Netanyahu, who would be Prime Minister of Israel after Rabin, writing back in 1986, claimed that suicide terror was a strategic threat to the world (see the case studies in Chapter 4).

Indeed, in the 1980s and 1990s, international terror or the Global Jihad prepared itself and conducted many bloody attacks using the tactic or weapon of suicide terror, culminating in the bloodiest day of them all, 9/11/2001. Since then there have been thousands of attacks, especially in Iraq.

This book provides the professional first responder and student of Homeland Security with an understanding of suicide terror as a tactic and also as a strategic tool used by terrorists worldwide. We have based the text on diligently researched findings, aimed at constructing a full picture of the challenge posed by the threat.

The Introduction sets the international context of the development of this weapon. Chapter 1 shows how the Global Jihad justifies the use of indiscriminate murder, the sources for the justification by radicals, and where this may take us. Chapter 2 looks at the Israeli experience in the eyes of those who most contributed to confronting this strategic threat to Israel's existence and, in that sense, makes a unique contribution to understanding the Israeli difficulties in dealing with such an effective mode of terror. Nothing would be complete in the realm of terrorism without a close look at the Iraqi experience that U.S. forces have encountered—without precedence in the history of terrorism. Chapter 4 looks at the wide reach of suicide terror and its internationalism. Some of the probable scenarios that pose the greatest risk and some ideas on mitigation are detailed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 addresses U.S. law enforcement's challenge in dealing with the threat of this weapon. No study would be complete without a look at

the medical response necessary to save lives and provide insights into the results of attacks as provided by Chapter 7.

It is our hope that we create a better understanding—and since knowledge is power—enabling our first responder community and homeland security professionals to be more ready for the challenges that this terrorist weapon of choice poses.

Though better understanding, we hope to make a modest contribution to avoiding the death and destruction that suicide terror wreaks on its victims.

OPHIR FALK
HENRY MORGENSTERN

Ramat-Gan, Israel
Miami Florida
April 2009



CONTENTS

Preface	xi
Acknowledgments	xv
Contributors	xvii
INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW AND HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE WEAPON	1
<i>Ophir Falk</i>	
Background	1
Defining the Threat	2
Definition Criteria	6
Proposed Definitions	6
Analyses of Data	23
Overview	25
Endnotes	26
1 THE GLOBAL JIHAD	31
<i>Henry Morgenstern</i>	
Introduction: Where Is the Jihad Today?	31
Do We Need to Know Why?	32
The Meaning of Jihad for the Jihadists (Mujahedeen)	35
The Origins and Evolution of the Global Jihad	35
Osama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri—The Al-Qaeda View of the Jihad	36
Support for the Global Jihad	41
Seminal Ideas and Movements that Have Led to the Global Jihad	42
Tauhid—The Oneness of God	42
Takfir	43
Jihad	43
Jahaliyyah	44
The Spread of the Jihad across the World	46
Case Study of Jihad Development: Egypt	47
The Jihad in the United States	49

Toward a Legal Definition of Terrorism in the United States	51
Financing and Organization	53
The Jihad: Version 2.0	56
The Jihad's Virtual 007	57
Real-Time Threat Example	59
Understanding Techno-Intelligence Signatures	59
Internet Activity and Terrorist Finance—Synergy in Cyberspace	60
The Global Jihad Has a New Home Base—The Internet	61
Conclusions	61
Appendix 1: Internet Sites and the Global Jihad	62
Appendix 2: Incidents in the United States since 9/11	63
Endnotes	68
2 ISRAEL'S CONFRONTATION WITH SUICIDE TERRORISM	73
<i>Amir Kulick</i>	
Background	73
Arab–Israeli Conflict	73
The First Circle: The Palestinian Suicide Bomber and His Motives	87
The Second Circle: The Organizational Wrapping	91
The Third Circle: The Social Wrapping	96
How Has Israel Confronted Suicide Terrorism?	105
The Prevention Circle	107
The Delay Circle	108
The Consequence Mitigation Circle	109
The Intelligence Level	110
The Intelligence Challenge in the War on Suicide Terrorism	110
Israeli Intelligence	112
The Operational Level	118
The Evolution of Israel's Responses to Suicide Terrorism—A Brief Historic Review	118
The Israeli Methods of Action	122
Targeted Killing	123
Passive Measures	135
Public Resilience	142
Deterring Suicide Bombers	142
Relevant Lessons for American Law Enforcement	144
Key Lessons Learned—Operative Level	145
Specific Lessons—Operational-Tactical Level	150

Summary and Conclusions	155
Endnotes	157
3 THE EAGLE AND THE SNAKE: AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH SUICIDE BOMBINGS	175
<i>Yaron Schwartz</i>	
The Origins of Suicide Attacks Against the United States	175
Suicide Bombings in Iraq	179
The Insurgency: Who, Why, When, and How	182
The Role of Suicide Bombings	193
Assessing the Surge	199
The Impact of Iraq and Its Lessons	208
Future Threats and Suicide Terrorism	213
Endnotes	214
Bibliography	221
4 THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SUICIDE TERRORISM	225
<i>Ophir Falk and Hadas Kroitoru</i>	
Lebanon	228
Hezbollah	228
Hezbollah's International Reach	231
The Iran–Hezbollah–al-Qaeda Connection	233
Hezbollah's Direct Threat to U.S. Homeland	234
Sri Lanka	235
A History of Conflict	235
The Tamil Tigers and Suicide Terrorism	236
Consequences and Counterterrorism Efforts	238
Israel	241
Historical Background	242
A Decade and a Half of Suicide Terrorism	243
Misconceptions	244
From Deterrence to Prevention and Preemption	244
Relevance to U.S. Homeland Security	247
Operational Lessons	247
India	248
History of Conflict	248
India's Experience with Suicide Terrorism	250
Turkey	253
Civil War and Civil Strife: The PKK's Answer to the "Kurdish Question"	253

Turkey's Experience with Suicide Terror	254
Islamic Groups Step Up to the Plate	258
Turkish Counterterrorism Tactics	259
Lessons from Turkey's Experience with Suicide Terrorism	261
Al-Qaeda	262
Establishing the "Base"	263
Al-Qaeda Organization: Affiliates and Networks	264
Al-Qaeda Attacks	266
Al-Qaeda in Europe	269
Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia	273
Consequences and Counterterrorism	274
The Future of al-Qaeda	277
Chechnya	278
History of Conflict	278
Chechen Separatists and Suicide Terrorism	279
Consequences and Counterterrorism	288
Summary and Conclusions—The Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism	289
Endnotes	290

5 HIGH-RISK SCENARIOS AND FUTURE TRENDS **301**

Ophir Falk

Scenario No. 1: Cyber and Physical Attack on Energy Distribution Systems	302
Description of Scenario	302
Vulnerability	305
Consequence	305
Means of Mitigation	306
Scenario No. 2: Attacks on and by Civilian Aircraft—Back to the Future	307
Description of Scenario	307
Vulnerability	309
Consequence	310
Means of Mitigation	310
Scenario No. 3: Dirty Bomb in Maritime Container	312
Description of Scenario	312
Vulnerability	314
Consequence	316
Means of Mitigation	317

Scenario No. 4: Blocking World Oil Transit by Sea	318
<i>Ofer Israeli</i>	
Description of Scenario	318
Vulnerability	320
Consequence	321
Means of Mitigation	324
Scenario No. 5: PC Doomsday	325
Description of Scenario	325
Vulnerability	326
Consequence	326
Means of Mitigation	327
Scenario No. 6: Suicide Terrorist Attack on Subway Followed by a Suicide Terrorist Attack in Premises of a Level I Trauma Center	327
<i>Shmuel C. Shapira</i>	
Description of Scenario	328
Vulnerability	328
Consequence	329
Means of Mitigation	329
Future Trends	331
Endnotes	333
6 METHODS FOR CONFRONTING SUICIDE TERROR	341
<i>William Cooper</i>	
Detection of Key Terrorist Activities	346
The Suicide Bomber	350
Detection of Terrorist Recruitment in the Community	350
Identifying Safe Houses and Planning Centers	353
Terrorist Means of Communication	355
Identifying Terrorist Transportation	363
Identifying Terrorist Financing	366
Identifying Paper Falsification	366
Land Attack Characteristics	367
Sea Attack Characteristics	368
Air Attack Characteristics	369
The Public and the Battle Against Terrorism	370
Legislation in the Battle Against Terrorism	371
Negotiation Tactics to Use in Incidents of Terror	372
Rules of Engagement	373

Response to Suicide/Homicide Bombers	374
Patrol Level Response	375
Operational Philosophy	377
Endnotes	378
7 MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF SUICIDE TERRORISM	381
<i>Shmuel C. Shapira and Leonard A. Cole</i>	
Explosives	382
Effects and Management of Suicide Terrorism	384
Preparing for Suicide Terror Mass Casualty Incidents	387
Mass Casualty Incident Management	389
Pre-Hospital Management, Short Term	389
Pre-Hospital Management, Prolonged Term	390
Hospital Management of Suicide Terrorism	392
Conclusion	393
Endnotes	393
Index	397